MOSCOW. March 23 (Interfax-AVN) - Russia's withdrawal from the Russian-U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is not an efficient response to the deployment of the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system, Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the U.S. and Canada Studies Director Sergei Rogov said.
"In general, it looks like we will weaken, not strengthen, our security if we withdraw from this treaty. The quite obvious reply of the United States and NATO will outweigh the military advantages that Russia may gain from announcing the deployment of intermediate range missiles many times over," an article by Rogov, published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye on Friday, says.
The USSR's gamble on intermediate-range missiles in the Cold War was not a winning one, he said.
"The U.S. global system of military and political alliances and multiple military bases near Russian territory made competing with Washington in such a nuclear arms area as intermediate-range missiles disadvantageous," Rogov said.
"We need an in-depth comprehensive analysis of expediency of both abidance by the INF Treaty and Russia's unilateral withdrawal from it," he noted.
"One may assume that Russia has a demand for intermediate-range missiles, in particular those carrying conventional warheads, as far as the military aspect is concerned. Then we should come up with an initiative to adjust the INF Treaty to this demand, i.e. to allow its signatories to have conventional intermediate-range missiles," Rogov said.
At the same time, "if the U.S. refuses to modernize the INF Treaty, Russia will still have the right to withdraw from it unilaterally, but in this case, it is expedient to announce the intention to deploy intermediate-range missiles with conventional warheads only," he said.
"But even this step must be thoroughly calculated, because the U.S. can deploy a considerable number of conventional cruise missiles on the territory of "new" NATO members, including Poland and the Baltic states, very quickly. One should not forget that the output of sea-based cruise missiles in the U.S. is as high as 400-500 items a year," Rogov stressed.
According to him, the Pentagon will have no serious technical or financial problems in quickly switching over to mass production of ground-based cruise missiles, banned by the INF Treaty.
"Taking into account the state of our air defense, deployment of U.S. ground-based cruise missiles very close to our borders will pose a deadly threat to the whole set of military, political and economic targets European Russia, which will be much bigger than missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland," he argued.
"As to our intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it is hardly expedient to resume production of Pioner systems, which was designed more than 30 years ago and manufactured in cooperation with Ukrainian enterprises. It is obvious that such a missile must be derived from two stages of the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile," he concluded.